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Abstract: This paper adopts as its point of reference an integrational semiology 
as developed by Oxford Professor of linguistics Roy Harris. It contrasts two 
contemporary approaches to communication as proposed by global semiotics 
and Saussurean semiology. Against the former, integrational linguists argue 
that there is no ‘science’ of communication (i.e., there is no way to isolate 
communication as a ‘thing’ and only then decide what is rightly called 
communication), and against the latter that there are no impersonal languages 
determining for its speakers what counts as communication and what does not. 
The paper introduces the Harrisian semiological notion of radical indeterminacy 
and suggests that a linguistics of the 21st century should be ‘lay-oriented’ and 
should recognize that individuals possess unique communicational histories.  
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1  Introduction: The ‘mystery’ of communication 
In his contribution to the present issue, Noam Chomsky concedes that “the 
unbounded use of [the] finite means”, i.e. “the actual production of speech in 
the free and creative ways that intrigued the great figures of the past” is still a 
mystery to this day and is likely to remain so permanently. In other words, for 
Chomsky human verbal communication might never be completely understood. 
There is no ‘science of communication’, while there is a ‘science of language’, 
i.e. “the study of the finite means” which, according to Chomsky, is best left to 
the “generative enterprise”. 
In my contribution I shall not pursue the question whether generative 
linguistics, and cognitive science more generally, have advanced our 
knowledge of what ‘language’ (and ‘a language’) is and whether its 
achievements might not rather be derived from a certain way of thinking about 
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language (and languages) – a particular philosophy of language – than from 
any rigorous scientific inquiry. Oxford Professor of linguistics Roy Harris 
tackled these and other questions pertinent to generative linguistics in great 
detail (e.g. Harris, 1987; Harris, 1997) as part of his trenchant critique of what he 
had come to call the Language Myth (Harris, 1981), namely the theses that 
languages are fixed codes and that verbal communication is a form of 
‘telementation’ (thought transference). To the best of my knowledge, Chomsky 
never responded to the Harrisian critique, though Borsely and Newmeyer (1997) 
did, remaining, however, the only ones in the generativist camp to have done so.  
Roy Harris’ linguistics, which he termed integrational linguistics (1998), is 
‘lay-oriented’: for this reason he could not have agreed with Chomsky’s view 
that the free and creative production of speech is ‘mysterious’. It might be if one 
seeks a scientific, i.e. an impersonal, perspective. However, from my own point 
of view, i.e. based on my personal linguistic experience, human communication 
is not ‘mysterious’ at all. How, then, can I express myself freely and creatively? I 
do so because at any point in time of my life I have got a personal history – and 
having had experiences in the past I also have memories of them, making it 
possible for me to anticipate my immediate communicational future. I have got 
experience of ‘interpersonal’ communication, i.e. talking and listening to other 
people, writing to them and reading what they have written; I also have 
experience of communicating to myself, both in thoughts, speech, and writing. I 
have a mind and a body with which I experience communication, and I 
experience it as an open-ended process, i.e., I experience communication as an 
ongoing process and any delineation of when a communicational episode starts 
and ends as a matter of contextualized interpretation. I experience 
communication as occurring in the here-and-now and as making sense to me 
only because I have an immediate past and an immediate future that the here-
and-now connects with. I experience communication as making all the 
difference depending on whether I know or don’t know the person I’m 
communicating with. If I write a note to myself it has to be legible only to me; if 
I write a note meant to be read by someone else I will engage in very different 
‘integrational’ tasks, both psychologically and biomechanically: I have to take 
into account who I am writing that note for (my wife, my children, the postman, 
an imaginary person, etc.). My experience also tells me that when I listen to 
conversations in languages unknown to me I do still make some sense of what 
is being said, i.e. I’m producing meaningful signs for myself. And I assume that 
my fellow-beings also experience communication fundamentally like that, 
though I cannot experience anybody else’s experiences of communication. 
Human communication becomes ‘mysterious’ if we posit that there must be a 
shared language, i.e. a shared system of given signs (given words), underlying 
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the communication that I personally experience as having and those episodes I 
remember having had. In other words, the ‘mystery’ arises as a consequence of 
treating human freedom and human creativity as requiring what Chomsky (1996: 
100) calls “a system of constraints and governing principles” (see Pablé, 2012). 
The mystery is a consequence of distinguishing between finite means and their 
free and creative use: that is, it is a consequence of treating signs as determinate 
rather than indeterminate. 
In this article I focus on the question of ‘communication’ as viewed within 
two schools of thought taking their inspiration from Peircean semiotics and 
Saussurean semiology, respectively. Neither school, however, argues that 
human (verbal) communication is a permanent mystery, while they both differ 
from Harris’ account of what human communication is. The fundamental 
difference, in fact, lies in the question of (in) determinacy. 
2  Global semiotics vs. human semiology 
So what is communication? A thing? A word? An idea? If it is a ‘thing’, then the 
question resembles other ontological questions asked in science: there is 
something that communication ‘is’. Semioticians of a Peircean tradition take a 
global view on communication – for them, the question ‘what is 
communication?’ is superordinate to questions like ‘what is human 
communication?’, ‘what is animal communication?’, ‘what is cellular 
communication?’, or questions like ‘how does human communication differ 
from non-human communication?’. It is not that semioticians are not interested 
in the qualifications and comparisons just mentioned, but rather they believe 
that the thing ‘communication’ transcends species-specific considerations: it is 
obvious that, say, bacteria and humans communicate differently, and it is 
essential to find out how either kind of communication works. On the other 
hand, it is beyond doubt that both bacteria and humans do engage in 
‘communication’. Such a view distinguishes culture-specific questions around 
communication from scientific questions on communication. In a scientific 
paradigm it is not pertinent whether a certain people or a certain tribe believe, 
say, that stones communicate: either stones communicate or they don’t. This 
approach is typical of the kind of semiotics that takes a global and totalizing 
view on communication, hence ‘global semiotics’. Other scholars treat 
communication as the prerogative of human beings; they tend to give 
preference to verbal communication and tend to regard non-verbal 
communication as a somewhat inferior form of communication. This approach 
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is typical of Saussurean semiology. Semiologists are interested in how human 
verbal communication works, and respectively how cultural and historical 
factors determine our view of communication. Saussure provided his students 
with a universal model of human verbal communication (known as the ‘talking 
heads’ model). At the same time, however, Saussure laid the theoretical 
foundations for treating human languages as semi-closed systems determining 
speakers’ (biased) views of reality.  
Despite their different outlooks, underlying both semiotics and semiology 
there is a certain conception of how human communication works, in particular 
how human verbal communication works. For instance, the semiotician Susan 
Petrilli assures her readers that when it comes to the term ‘intercellular 
communication’, which denotes communication between cells, “nobody would 
misunderstand that reference is to two people communicating with a mobile” 
(2015: 219). That nobody would interpret intercellular communication in this way 
presupposes a theory of the verbal sign that regards it as having a fixed 
meaning, sanctioned – not by the language-user – but by the language itself 
and the contexts of use. For the semiotician, communication is crucially about 
signs. Thomas A. Sebeok – like Peirce – believed that “the whole universe is 
perfused with signs” (in Petrilli, 2015: 173), and hence that the whole universe 
communicates. Semioticians take a very broad (i.e. global) approach to 
‘communication’: nonhuman communication and human communication are 
treated as equally accessible to empirical research. The semiologist, in turn, 
holds that communication is a human and highly culture-specific concept, i.e., 
one cannot separate questions about the thing ‘communication’ from questions 
about the word communication: these questions are bound to the speech 
community that shares a certain language. The semiological school discussed 
here, Anna Wierzbicka’s Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM), subscribes to a 
strong relativist position on language and communication. Both approaches, 
global semiotics and NSM theory, have been discussed in greater detail from an 
integrational linguistic perspective (however, not with special reference to 
communication) by Pablé and Hutton (2015) and Wawrzyniak (2010), 
respectively. 
3  The ‘signs of life’ 
In a recent article, Susan Petrilli (2015) tells her readers “global semiotics 
provides a meeting point and observation post for studies on the ‘signs of life’ 
and ‘life of signs’” (p. 173). Petrilli quotes Sebeok as saying “semiosis, that is 
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sign activity and life converge” (p. 173): they are co-extensive. For Sebeok it is 
axiomatic that “semiosis is the criterial attribute of life” (p. 173). To maintain 
and produce life necessarily involves signs. Echoing Sebeok, Petrilli warns 
against a shortsighted, i.e. an anthropocentric and glottocentric approach to 
signs, such as typical of semiologists, in particular the Saussureans. According 
to Petrilli, the Saussurean program of studying signs “as part of social life” has 
led to the so-called ‘pars pro toto’ fallacy (p. 175). The fallacy consists in the 
tendency to exchange verbal semiosis for semiosis in its totality, and to treat the 
verbal sign model as a general model of the sign (p. 191). Petrilli argues that for 
the semiotician there exists a biosphere in which messages / emitters / 
generators / sources / interpreteds, on one hand, and addressees / receivers / 
interpretants, on the other, all belong to one and the same gigantic semiosic 
network. (p. 199) 
Sebeok called this network, or web, the ‘semiosphere’. It is interesting to 
notice that the kinds of communication supposedly taking place in this 
semiosphere are highly reminiscent of human verbal communication, as 
usually envisaged within mainstream linguistics: there is a ‘message’ 
communicated by an ‘emitter’ (or ‘sender’) on one end that is to reach an 
‘addressee’ (or ‘receiver’) at the other end. At the same time, however, Petrilli 
emphasizes that the ‘signs of life’ are for the most part nonverbal ones:  
[…] it is the nonverbal sign that invests terrestrial semiosis overall and constitutes the 
distinctive characteristic of life itself. In four of the five superkingdoms […], semiosis is 
uniquely nonverbal; only in the fifth, that which is inhabited by the animal called Homo 
sapiens sapiens, do verbal signs come on to the scene to join nonverbal signs. (p. 204) 
As Petrilli sees it, biologists have provided the necessary proofs that 
communication is not bound by what ordinary language allows the word 
communication to mean. For the semiotician, therefore, it is not relevant that it 
sounds right (for English speakers) to say that animals communicate, and 
perhaps that it equally sounds right in contemporary English to say that 
bacteria communicate. That alone does not warrant the conclusion that animals 
or bacteria ‘really’ do communicate. Since communication is a ‘thing’, it is a 
question for biologists, among other scientists, to determine the correct 
definition of communication for purposes of science communication – which 
also means that it certainly isn’t the lexicographer’s job nor, ultimately, the lay 
speaker’s. In Petrilli’s (2015) own words: 
Studies in the sphere of biology now reveal that members forming the other two super 
kingdoms, plants and fungi, also qualify as communicating. Not only: communication is 
also present in microorganisms. Communication involves cells endowed with an 
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unencapsulated nucleus, that is, prokaryotes and bacteria. And it also involves the more 
developed cells endowed with an encapsulated nucleus, that is, eukaryotes. (p. 218) 
Following Sebeok, Petrilli proposes a view of communication that is co-
extensive with life itself, although this, as she admits, may not be the entire 
story: “In fact, whilst it is not certain that where there is no life, there is no 
communication, there is no doubt that where there is life there is 
communication” (p. 219). 
4  Understanding communication through modern 
science  
Global semiotics, therefore, is the attempt of placing homo sapiens in its proper 
place: signs (and thus communication) existed long before the advent of 
mankind and long before the introduction of the metasign, of which only 
human beings are capable. This recognition would seem to open up completely 
new ways of understanding communication. However, as I am going to argue, 
we also seem to be unable to conceive of nonhuman communication other than 
in terms of human communication – a thesis that the semiotician would clearly 
reject. In order to make my point, I am going to discuss communication in 
relation to contemporary research on microorganisms. In 2009, Princeton 
molecular biologist Bonnie Bassler delivered a TED talk, in which she described 
bacterial communication, which occurs at a level that Roy Harris (2005: 178) has 
termed ‘subanthropic’ (i.e. at a level beyond the reach of the unaided human 
senses), by resorting to vocabulary belonging to the ‘anthropic’ experience of 
communication.1 
At the beginning of her talk, Dr. Bassler said, half-humorously, that she 
prefers to think of humans as 1-10% ‘human’ and 99-90% ‘bacterial’. So it 
would seem that for Bassler to understand human beings you need first of all to 
understand bacteria. What Bassler does in her explanations, however, is 
precisely the opposite: she anthropomorphizes bacteria. Keeping in mind that 
we may only be 1% ‘human’, what Bassler may be implying here is that the 
terminology typically used for human communication (‘communication’, 
‘language’, ‘words’) is actually, from an evolutionary perspective, the 
terminology pertinent to bacteria. Bacteria had a ‘language’ – and ‘words’ 
 
1 TED – an acronym for Technology, Entertainment, Design – denotes an Internet lecture series. 
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making up that language – way before human beings developed human 
languages and human words. So the question is: does Bassler regard the terms 
used to discuss bacterial communication as metaphorical at all?  
Bassler’s triggering experiment involved an oceanic bacterium that, when 
in a community of fellow-bacteria, makes light (together with all the other 
bacteria of its kind), whereas when it is alone it does not. As Bassler (2009) 
states: 
The question that we had is how can bacteria, these primitive organisms, tell the 
difference from times when they’re alone, and times when they’re in a community, and 
then all do something together. What we’ve figured out is that the way that they do that is 
that they talk to each other, and they talk with a chemical language. 
This ‘chemical language’, Bassler tells us, consists of ‘chemical words’: 
This is now supposed to be my bacterial cell. When it’s alone it doesn’t make any light. 
But what it does do is to make and secrete small molecules that you can think of like 
hormones, and these are the red triangles, and when the bacteria is alone the molecules 
just float away and so no light. But when the bacteria grow and double and they’re all 
participating in making these molecules, the molecule – the extracellular amount of that 
molecule increases in proportion to cell number. And when the molecule hits a certain 
amount that tells the bacteria how many neighbors there are, they recognize that 
molecule and all of the bacteria turn on light in synchrony. That’s how bioluminescence 
works – they’re talking with these chemical words. 
About the molecules found in the bacteria, Bassler goes on to say: 
The left-hand part of the molecule is identical in every single species of bacteria. But the 
right-hand part of the molecule is a little bit different in every single species. What that 
does is to confer exquisite species specificities to these languages. Each molecule fits into 
its partner receptor and no other. So these are private, secret conversations. These 
conversations are for intraspecies communication. Each bacterium uses a particular 
molecule, that’s its language that allows it to count its own siblings. 
Bassler tells us that bacteria are ‘multilingual’: they have their own ‘native 
language’, but are also fluent speakers of a ‘lingua franca’, shared by all 
different kinds of bacteria: 
So we went back to molecular biology and started studying different bacteria, and what 
we’ve found now is that in fact, bacteria are multilingual. They all have a species-specific 
system –they have a molecule that says “me.” But then, running in parallel to that is a 
second system that we’ve discovered, that’s generic. So, they have a second enzyme that 
makes a second signal and it has its own receptor, and this molecule is the trade language 
of bacteria. It’s used by all different bacteria and it’s the language of interspecies 
communication. What happens is that bacteria are able to count how many of me and how 
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many of you. They take that information inside, and they decide what tasks to carry out 
depending on who’s in the minority and who’s in the majority of any given population. […] 
What the important thing is that we learned is that every bacterium has exactly the same 
enzyme and makes exactly the same molecule. So they’re all using this molecule for 
interspecies communication. This is the bacterial ‘Esperanto’. […] Once we got that far, we 
started to learn that bacteria can talk to each other with this chemical language. But what 
we started to think is that maybe there is something practical that we can do here as well. 
I’ve told you that bacteria do have all these social behaviors; they communicate with these 
molecules. 
So bacteria do ‘in-group’ talking, but they also engage in ‘interspecies 
communication’: in either case the communication works because they ‘speak’ 
the same ‘language’. Human beings did not invent the codes that we think 
human languages are. Bassler grants bacteria with being inventors of ‘simple 
systems’. 
This is exactly what happens in your body. It’s not like your heart cells and your kidney 
cells get all mixed up every day, and that’s because there’s all of this chemistry going on, 
these molecules that say who each of these groups of cells is, and what their tasks should 
be. Again, we think that bacteria invented that, and you’ve just evolved a few more bells 
and whistles, but all of the ideas are in these simple systems that we can study. 
Bassler’s research aims at overcoming the drug-resistance of bacteria to 
antibiotics by disturbing both the bacteria’s intraspecies and interspecies 
communication, i.e. to prevent them from talking to each other, which means to 
prevent them from counting the number of bacteria and hence launching their 
attacks on the human organism. Bassler concludes her TED talk as follows: 
We think that this is the next generation of antibiotics and it’s going to get us around, at 
least initially, this big problem of resistance. What I hope you think, is that bacteria can 
talk to each other, they use chemicals as their words, they have an incredibly complicated 
chemical lexicon that we’re just now starting to learn about. 
Bassler believes that bacteria have a personal identity and know that other 
bacteria have one too. They are ‘human-like’ – or rather we are ‘bacteria-like’: 
I hope that what you’ve learned is that bacteria can distinguish self from other. By using 
these two molecules they can say “me” and they can say “you”. 
So Bassler seems to think that there is a lot for us to learn about ourselves 
from bacteria. This hardly passes muster as a ‘humanist’ discourse in the 
traditional sense. As Bassler herself says, humans have “just evolved a few more 
bells and whistles” – we are not as special as we thought we were. 
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It could be argued that the terminology used by Bassler in her TED talk, 
familiar from human linguistic affairs (e.g.‘communication’, ‘language’, ‘words’, 
‘lexicon’, ‘conversation’, ‘talking to each other’, ‘saying’) serves to make her 
research understandable to an educated lay audience. It could therefore be 
argued further that Bassler never intended us to really believe that bacteria ‘talk 
to each other’. And yet, there is the feeling that Bassler is talking about ‘things’: 
if Bassler uses the terms chemical language and chemical words, this ‘language’ 
and these ‘words’ are not supposed to reveal themselves, in a later phase of 
research, as something totally different. It is unlikely that Bassler will step 
forward in the future and declare: ‘we first thought that bacteria were 
communicating via a chemical language consisting of chemical words, but it 
turns out that it is not at all like a language and these are certainly not words 
they are using. Actually bacteria aren’t really communicating after all’. Bassler, 
it seems to me, expects words (in their function as names) to be mirror images of 
reality when part of scientific discourse. She would not want her audience to 
think that she is merely attaching her own private ideas to words such as 
‘language’ and ‘communication’. To use the word communication correctly in 
science talk is to use it in connection with the right referent: thus, bacteria 
‘communicate’ if they really communicate. That communication is an English 
word doesn’t seem to worry Bassler in the least. Bassler, as I see it, isn’t 
speaking metaphorically after all. 
Semioticians would certainly not approve of Bassler’s anthropomorphizing 
discourse: bacteria don’t really ‘talk to each other’, the semiotician would likely 
protest, adding that Bassler is guilty of committing the ‘pars pro toto’ fallacy. At 
the same time, they would fully agree with Bassler that bacteria do 
communicate, and they would add that they do so by means of signs. Doesn’t 
Bassler’s research demonstrate precisely this? But Bassler never cares to define 
what a sign is – in fact, she is talking about bacteria as if they were capable of 
signs that are like verbal signs – nor does she think it necessary to provide her 
audience with a definition of communication. Presumably, for her, a sign is 
anything that someone/something interprets as standing for something 
particular. Susan Petrilli (2015: 226) herself doesn’t find it strange to use the 
verb interpret in conjunction with microorganisms and the immune system. 
Hence: bacteria interpret this or that as ‘standing for’ this or that. The 
semiotician argues that every creature has its own species-specific Umwelt in 
which it generates signs – an insight developed by the ‘cryptosemiotician’ Jakob 
von Uexküll. We – human beings – assign meanings to signs according to the 
human Umwelt, but at the same time we can develop an understanding of what 
the signs ‘mean’ for animals, bacteria, fungi, cells, etc. Following Thomas A. 
Sebeok, the pure fact of living is already to display ‘signs of life’ and to enable 
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us to study the ‘life of signs’. Therefore: life presupposes signs, and where there 
are signs there is communication. 
5  The cultural relativity of communication 
Semiologists of a Saussurean creed, in turn, approach the issue of 
‘communication’ in an altogether different manner. Here communication is not 
a culture-neutral ‘thing’, a phenomenon of objective reality, but instead a 
culture-laden word that has its own language-specific semantic history, as 
recorded by dictionaries based on historical principles (such as the OED). 
Whether bacteria ‘really’ have a language or whether they ‘really’ do 
communicate is a superfluous question within semiology, not because the 
semiologist denies that there is an objective reality, but because for Homo 
sapiens knowledge of this objective kind is an illusion created by science. 
Reality, for the semiologist, is a social construct made possible by the abstract 
linguistic system shared by a community of people. If in contemporary English 
the verb to communicate can be used in connection with bacteria, then this is 
what is ‘real’ for contemporary speakers of English: bacteria communicate. The 
community of scientists using scientific English are subject to the very same 
discursive constraints imposed on them by the system of that particular vehicle 
language. This, however, does not imply that members of other speech 
communities would say of bacteria that they ‘communicate’ in their respective 
languages. For the semiologist the English word communication, when used in 
academic discourse, is not simply an international, and thus mutually 
understandable, term. For example, the linguist Anna Wierzbicka (2006) recalls 
the awkwardness of having to teach a course in intercultural communication at a 
Polish university: 
The current international career of the concept ‘communication’ is a good case in point. It 
is a concept well entrenched in the English language […] and quickly spreading into other 
languages, including, for example, my native Polish. During my student days, in 
colloquial Polish the word komunikacja referred to transport and traffic, not to speech, 
and when I started to teach a course on cross-cultural communication I couldn’t translate 
this readily into Polish, because there was no (non-technical) word in Polish for 
‘communication’ in that sense. Today, speakers of Polish would readily use for this 
purpose the old Polish word komunikacja, with a new meaning, which appears to have 
come into the Polish conceptual world through English. (p. 682) 
Thus academic discourse becomes streamlined via semantic loans, but this 
does not happen in all languages and across all domains. Anna Wierzbicka and 
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her colleague Cliff Goddard developed a linguistic theory known as Natural 
Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) that is meant to bring about conceptual clarity 
when it comes to conceptually complex, language-specific words. The meaning 
of the English word communication, for example, is inextricably bound to an 
‘Anglo’ way of thinking, itself historically related to John Locke. As Goddard 
(2009) assures us: 
[…] the word communication (not to mention system) is both semantically complex and 
highly language-specific. Even many languages of Europe do not have a word exactly 
matching the particular semantic configuration we find in the modern English word 
communication. (p. 12) 
In connection with the word communication, Goddard identifies two other 
words, namely message and information, which are said to constitute “a key 
cultural model of modern Anglo culture”. According to Goddard (2009: 15), 
when we say that the addressee ‘understands’ what the speaker ‘means’ we are 
also putting things in very ‘English-specific terms’. The English verb to mean 
establishes a connection between the ‘meaning’ of words and the ‘intention’ 
with which these words are used (‘I didn’t mean it in this sense’). A leading 
model of communication in pragmatics, in fact, conceives of successful 
communication in terms of the hearer getting the ‘intentions’ behind the 
speaker’s words. The intentionalist model of communication, it could be argued, 
also corresponds to an ‘Anglo’ way of thinking, going back to philosophers of 
language Grice and Searle. In his article on how the ‘communication’ concept 
has been approached in pragmatics, Michael Haugh (2009: 91) identifies two 
strands, namely an ‘Anglo-American’ pragmatic school and a ‘European-
Continental’ pragmatic school, the latter in fact paying more heed to the social 
and cultural constraints on language use. 
At the same time, Goddard fails to tell his readers what philosophy of 
communication he himself subscribes to. For talking about communication (as 
Goddard does) presupposes a model of communication. There is little doubt 
that, as a Saussurean and linguistic relativist, Goddard assumes that human 
verbal communication is ‘telementational’, that is, in order to be communicated, 
words have to trigger the same concepts in the speaker and listener’s minds (or 
respectively the writer and reader’s minds), and that ‘telementation’ works 
because languages (as well as dialects and linguistic varieties) are ‘codes’. 
Goddard hardly wishes to argue that because the word communication and its 
‘equivalent’ cognate words in other languages mean different things to speakers 
of different languages, the way human verbal communication ‘is’ also differs. 
The lay speakers don’t see the ‘reality’ of communication because their vision is 
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obfuscated by the abstract mental linguistic system they possess as a result of 
having been born into a particular speech community. The linguistic theorists, 
on the other hand, when speaking qua theorists, are exempted from the 
constraints on cultural relativity: what they proclaim ex cathedra is not relative 
to the language they communicate in and communicate with, nor to the belief 
system they inherited as members of a specific culture.  
Goddard (2009: 17) argues that according to the Anglo way of thinking the 
verb to communicate, referring to one person saying things to another person, 
always implies that this communication be ‘efficient’ or ‘successful’, and thus 
that “the speaker wants the addressee to understand well what he/she has to 
say”. This is what Goddard sees as a “culture-specific attitude towards verbal 
interaction” typical of the Anglophone. He (2009: 17) goes on to say: 
[…] from a position within Anglo culture (and within the English language), this attitude 
can seem so natural as to go unnoticed, but the fact is that people can say things to other 
people for a great variety of reasons.  
He adds that when people say things to other people, in many situations “it 
may not be particularly important whether the other person knows exactly what 
one wants to say to them” (2009: 17). That the English verb to communicate 
implies full understanding (of meaning, intentions, etc.) between the speaker 
and the hearer is something that Goddard knows as a native speaker of 
contemporary English. It is one of the meanings that English dictionaries will 
attribute to the verb to communicate and the noun communication: it is a 
historically grown lexical meaning (Saussure’s diachronic change), which is 
shared by a community of speakers at a certain point in time (Saussure’s 
synchronic state). Saussure’s position implies a highly deterministic view on 
‘reality’ as linguistically and discursively mediated. Wierzbicka and Goddard 
have taken the logical step following from Saussure’s theoretical point, which is 
to deny the possibility of using, say, English as a neutral language in which to 
discuss communication theory. To talk about ‘communication’ in English, as a 
native speaker of English, is to discuss it the Anglo way: the cultural bias cannot 
be overcome in any conventional human language – not even in scientific 
English. However, even if John Locke was the first one to use the English noun 
communication in a modern sense, thus focusing on the message content, which 
requires the matching of ideas in individuals’ minds, he still did not pull his 
model out of a clear blue theoretical sky. Locke’s model of communication owes 
much to Aristotelian semiotics: for Aristotle, words do not stand for the things 
they designate directly but via an identical mental impression each individual 
stores of the things in reality. As Roy Harris has argued throughout his career, a 
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certain way of thinking about language and communication is endemic to 
Western intellectual thought (e.g. Harris, 1980). It is likely that Wierzbicka 
would not accept this thesis, saying that Harris cannot grasp the thought-worlds 
associated with Old Greek, Latin, and German (among others), and thus is in no 
position, as a twentieth-century Anglo writer, to identify this presumed 
common, millennium-old thread of thinking in a determinate way about signs, 
language, and communication. Ideas, for the linguistic relativist, cannot exist 
but as part of the abstract linguistic community code, the langue. If an idea 
spreads, then it needs a word to attach itself to, either a neologism or an 
already-existing word to which a new meaning is added. But could the Greeks or 
Romans have subscribed to a ‘telementational’ model of communication, as 
Harris has claimed, if they didn’t have that word, or a different word with the 
equivalent meaning?  
Goddard and Wierzbicka’s point is that one mustn’t be deceived into 
believing that cognate words, like English communication and Spanish 
comunicación, are semantically equivalent: as they would point out, the 
differences concern both the diachronic and synchronic levels in crucial 
respects. This only makes sense because Goddard and Wierzbicka adopt a 
Saussurean view of the sign, the sign consisting of an indivisible unity between 
signifier and signified. What a word means is what the abstract synchronic 
system allows it (or did allow it) to mean. Words themselves are polysemous, i.e. 
every word can have different (often related) meanings. As Wierzbicka (2006: 
692) makes clear, word meanings are social facts: they cannot be changed at 
will and are not a matter of opinion. 
Is crosslinguistic communication a cause perdue, then? Adherents to the 
Natural Semantic Metalanguage approach don’t think so. What needs to be done 
when it comes to highly complex semantic configurations behind superficially 
familiar (and crosslinguistically accessible) words (like communication, 
language, dialogue, etc.) is to resort to a metalanguage for semantic/conceptual 
explication that consists of so-called ‘semantic primes’; As Goddard (2009: 12) 
explains, these primes are “simple, indefinable meanings”, which “appear as 
the meanings of words or word-like expressions in all languages”. Examples of 
such semantic primes are people, someone, something, somewhere, words, want, 
do, say, know, good, bad, because (among others).  
Thus Goddard (2009: 18) offers the following semantic description of the 
English noun communication (in the sense of the hearer reaching, ideally, full 
understanding of what the speaker intended the addressee to understand): 
communication 
a) something 
b) people can say what with the word communication 
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c) people can want to say something about something with this word 
when they think like this: 
d) ‘It can be like this: 
e) at some times someone wants to say some things to someone 
else 
f) at these times this someone wants this other someone to know 
well what  he/she wants to say 
g) because of this, this someone says some things to this other 
someone 
h) when he/she says it, this other someone can know well what 
this someone  wants to say 
i) it is good if it can be like this 
j) it can be not like this if this someone says these things in 
another way’ 
Interestingly enough, the semantic explication of the noun communication 
presented here only makes sense because words are treated as having meaning 
independently of communication; the word communication itself is no 
exception. For example, what counts as ‘saying things’ or ‘saying something’ is 
highly context-sensitive, not only because it is culture-specific but also because 
individuals contextualize linguistic items constrained by factors of a 
biomechanical and circumstantial nature (Harris, 1998). There is no objective 
court of appeal passing judgment about whether someone really ‘said 
something’ to someone else. Speakers of English don’t automatically agree on 
whether a particular instance of interaction would count as ‘communication’. 
Are there objective standards for assessing whether someone ‘said something’ 
to somebody else? Pace Goddard and Wierzbicka, presumed ‘universal’ (and 
hence language-neutral) concepts expressed in English as say and something 
are treated like any other language-specific words: thus, the word say needs to 
be interpreted by someone as that particular word in the first place. Semantic 
primes have to be formulated as words of some natural language. Simply 
claiming that the semantic primes are abstract concepts (they are language-less) 
in spite of their ‘outer appearance’, which is language-specific, puts the cart 
before the horse. It doesn’t constitute evidence that universal semantic primes 
exist. 
The conceptual explication proposed by the natural semanticists is meant 
to remedy the fact that language-specific words are not translatable 
crossculturally, at least not in the sense that there is an exact equivalent in 
language B of a word belonging to language A. The semantic primes thus enable 
speakers of different languages to talk about ‘things’ as perceived from the 
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point of view of one particular language. Through the componential semantic 
analysis proposed in NSM, anyone can learn what meanings are ascribed to the 
English word communication, i.e. the word is made completely transparent.  
6  Semiotics, semiology, and philosophy of 
language 
The two approaches to communication discussed here both assume that words, 
in their function as names, ‘stand for’ something. In the global semiotic 
framework communication is a ‘thing’ that the word communication (and its 
equivalent terms in other languages) identifies. The semiotician has decided 
that any life form is engaged in semiosis, thus in sign-making. Where there are 
signs, moreover, there is communication. Thus: to say that bacteria, the 
immune system, plants, and insects communicate – and not only human beings 
– is merely to state what scientific research has shown to be true. Culture-
specific reservations are not the semiotician’s concern, as scientific English is 
not primarily interested in any cultural and historical connotations of the 
English word communication. Names in scientific English are substitutes for the 
things themselves: they are, in some sense, ‘culture-less’. The semiologist, in 
turn, regards phrases like animal communication or sentences like cells 
communicate with each other or two computers that communicate as “extended 
uses of the core meaning of communicate” (Goddard, 2009: 16), that is they are 
social facts of the language: these uses are perfectly fine as long as we keep in 
mind that it is the English language that allows us to postulate that cells 
‘communicate’. At the same time, it seems that these ‘extended uses of the core 
meaning of communicate’ have become the core meaning of the word within 
academic linguistic circles. As Timothy Curnow (2009: 30) tells us, certain 
introductory textbooks to linguistics (e.g. Fromkin & Rodman, 1978; Fromkin, 
Rodman et al., 2005; O’Grady et al., 1997) use the word communication very 
sparingly, in fact hardly ever in connection with human communication, but 
rather in connection with animal communication or computer communication. 
According to Curnow, for many academic linguists nonhuman communication 
contrasts with human language/languages.  
Thus, from the point of view of human semiology, American molecular 
biologist Bonnie Bassler found that bacteria communicate because she is a 
speaker of English. Perhaps if she had been a speaker of Armenian or Urdu she 
wouldn’t have used a term in her language comparable to the English noun 
communication, and hence she would have understood and explained her 
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research and her findings in a very different manner. Goddard argues that 
scientific terminology should be “detached from the grip of any single 
language” (2009: 24) in order to enable a kind of scientific communication that 
does not suppress the unavoidable culture-specificity of any language or any 
register. He adds, “the more promising approach would be to decompose these 
and other useful, but language-specific terms, into configurations of semantic 
primes” (2009: 24). Needless to say that natural scientists will hardly be 
interested in decomposing each and every conceptually complex word that 
plays a role in their research into configurations of semantic primes. It is not 
clear whether the NSM people would expect that from natural scientists. 
However, the humanities are advised to follow this procedure. As Goddard 
states,  
[N]either communication nor language (nor competing terms such as discourse, interaction, 
semiotics, ‘languaging’, etc.) are suitable conceptual tools for the human sciences […]. 
(2009: 24) 
So on the one hand we find the position that communication is useless as a 
metalinguistic term in the humanities; on the other hand we encounter the 
position that the word communication can be applied to any referent 
unhesitatingly. In spite of two philosophies of language that seem to be 
diametrically opposed, both the semiologist and the semiotician regard verbal 
signs as determinate. For both there is a link between the name and what it 
stands for: in one case the link is determined by mind-independent reality; in 
the other case the link is established in the act of speech as determined by the 
value assigned to that word in the overall structure of the language, i.e. how 
reality has been divided up by a speech community. 
7  Conclusion: An alternative semiology 
But what if signs were indeterminate? What if the word communication cannot 
fulfill the respective expectation of designating a thing of objective reality 
(independently of context), and being a word whose meaning is shared by 
millions of speakers who all participate in the same social contract that is 
‘language’? Let’s adopt the alternative sign theory, i.e. one based on 
indeterminacy (as postulated by Roy Harris). According to this theory, it is 
wrong to justify the word communication based on the claim that there is a 
‘thing’ that the word faithfully depicts. According to this theory, it is also wrong 
to argue in favor of the existence of an abstract word communication, which is 
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supposed to (miraculously) mean ‘the same’ to each and every native speaker of 
English because it is embedded in a historically grown collective mental 
structure. Rather, the sign communication is not ‘given’ (either in concordance 
with mind-independent Nature or as established by human collectivities): as the 
integrational linguist argues, in order to count as a sign someone has to make it 
a sign of something. This recognizes that for human beings there cannot be a 
final answer to the question “What is communication?”, but it also rescues us 
from having to resign to the fact that communication is ‘merely’ a word – an 
English word to boot – and that therefore we cannot talk meaningfully about 
‘communication’ in English (or in any other language). To assume otherwise is 
to surrender to language itself – one way or the other – and by doing so to give 
up our very ‘humanity’. The alternative theory that Harris envisaged admits that 
signs are personal (they are part of my personal communicational experience), 
which is not to be understood as a denial of the social constraints on 
communication. My personal experience of the word communication also 
includes my experience of other people in relation to this presumably ‘identical’ 
word. However, what ‘communication’ is and what the word communication 
means for other people, one cannot tell from any other perspective than that of 
one’s personal communicational experience.  
Perhaps until today you didn’t know that bacteria communicate, or if you 
did you may not have known that they do so by ‘talking to each other’ or by 
‘conversing with each other’, using two different ‘languages’ consisting each of 
a ‘lexicon’. Perhaps you can say that the word communication has acquired a 
new meaning for you as a result of this personal communicational encounter. It 
doesn’t follow from this, however, that you are forced to admit having advanced 
your knowledge of what communication ‘is’. 
How, then, can we advance our knowledge of communication in a way 
commensurate with twenty-first century scientific progress? I don’t think the 
Harrisian linguist can give a satisfactory answer to this question, his domain 
being that of philosophy of language. What is clear to the Harrisian linguist, 
however, is that even the very best science is founded on certain semiological 
assumptions: it could be argued against integrational linguists that these 
assumptions have stood the test of time, but this is so only because they were 
never seriously questioned – until Roy Harris introduced his tenet of the radical 
indeterminacy of the sign (e.g. Harris & Hutton, 2007: 201). The time has come 
for demythologizing twenty-first century linguistics (and the semiological 
theories it sponsors); no profit can be gained from waiting for another hundred 
years. 
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